Quality Trailer Products Corporation

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IN THE MATTER OF QUALITY TRAILER PRODUCTS CORPORATION CONSENT ORDER, ETC., INREGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT Docket C-3403. Complaint, Nov. 5, 1992--Decision, Nov. 5, 1992 This consent order prohibits, among other things, a Texas manufacturer, seller, and distributor of axle products from requesting, suggesting, urging, or advocating that its competitors raise, fix or stabilize prices or price levels, or cease providing discounts. It also prohibits the respondent from entering into agreements that fix, raise, or stabilize prices. In addition, the order requires the respondent to provide a copy of the order to all of its directors, officers, and management employees.

Appearances For the Commission: Michael E. Antalics.

For the respondent: Paul B. Hewitt. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, Washington, D.C.

COMPLAINT Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Act, the Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that Quality Trailer Products Corporation, a corporation, hereinafter sometimes referred to as respondent or Quality5 1 11 1 5 6 1273 2256 134 35 96.533890 Trailers 1 11 1 5 7 1430 2256 201 40 95.200470 Products, has violated the provisions of said Act, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint stating its charges in that respect as follows:

PARAGRAPH 1. Respondent Quality Trailer Products Corporation is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Texas with its office and principal place of business located at 633 Northwest Parkway, Azle, QUALITY TRAILER PRODUCTS CORPORATION 945 944 Decision and Order Texas and its headquarters mailing address at P.O. Box 1349, Azle, Texas.

PAR. 2. Respondent is now, and for some time has been, engaged in the manufacture, advertising, offering for sale, sale and distribution of axle products. Axle products means axles of any size, hubs, spindles, brakes, and any other products used in making axles. PAR. 3. Respondent maintains and has maintained a substantial course of business, including the acts and practices as hereinafter set forth, which are in or affect commerce, as commerce is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act.

PAR. 4. In the fall of 1990, two representatives of Quality Trailer Products visited the headquarters of a competitor and met with an officer of the firm. During the course of the meeting, they invited the competitor to fix prices. They told the competitor that its price for certain axle products was too low, that there was plenty of room in the industry for both firms, and that there was no need for the two companies to compete on price. They also provided assurances to the competitor that Quality Trailer Products would not sell certain axle products below a specified price. The invitation, if accepted, would have constituted an agreement in restraint of trade. PAR. 5. The aforesaid acts and practices constitute unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The acts and practices herein alleged are continuing and will continue in the absence of the relief herein requested.

DECISION AND ORDER The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft of complaint which the Bureau of Competition proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45; and The respondent, its attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, Decision and Order 115 F.T.C.

an admission by respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent has violated the said Act, and that complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Quality Trailer Products Corporation is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Texas with its office and principal place of business located at 633 Northwest Parkway, Azle, Texas and its headquarters mailing address at P.O. Box 1349, Azle, Texas. 2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER For purposes of this order, the following definitions shall apply: A. Respondent means Quality Trailer Products Corporation, its predecessors, subsidiaries, divisions, groups, and affiliates controlled by Quality Trailer Products Corporation, and all their respective directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives, and all their respective successors and assigns.

B. Axle5 1 8 1 2 3 942 2725 194 46 95.683304 products means axles of any size, hubs, spindles, brakes, and any other products used in making axles. QUALITY TRAILER PRODUCTS CORPORATION 947 944 Decision and Order Il.

It is ordered, That respondent, directly or indirectly, through any corporation, subsidiary, division or other device, in connection with the manufacture, advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any axle products in or affecting commerce, as commerce is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, forthwith cease and desist from:

A. Requesting, suggesting, urging, or advocating that any other producer or seller of axle products raise, fix or stabilize prices or price levels, cease providing discounts, or engage in any other pricing action; and B. Entering into, threatening or attempting to enter into, adhering to, maintaining, or carrying out any combination, conspiracy, agreement, understanding, plan or program with any other producer or seller of axle products to fix, raise, establish, control, maintain or stabilize prices or price levels.

Provided, That nothing in this order shall prohibit respondent from: (1) agreeing to purchase or distribute any competitor's axle products, and (2) negotiating or agreeing upon the price under which any competitor's axle product will be purchased by respondent. Ill.

It is further ordered, That respondent shall: A. Within thirty (30) days after the date on which this order becomes final, provide a copy of this order to all of its directors, officers, and management employees;

B. For a period of five (5) years after the date on which this order becomes final, and within ten (10) days after the date on which any person becomes a director, officer, or management employee of respondent provide a copy of this. order to such person; and C. Require each person to whom a copy of this order is furnished pursuant to subparagraphs III. A. and B. of this order to sign and submit to Quality Trailer Products Corporation within thirty (30) Concurring Statement 115 F.T.C.

days of the receipt thereof a statement that: (1) acknowledges receipt of the order; (2) represents that the undersigned has read and understands the order; and (3) acknowledges that the undersigned has been advised and understands that non-compliance with the order may subject respondent to penalties for violation of the order. IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent shall: A. File with the Commission a verified written report setting forth in detail the manner and form in which respondent has complied and is complying with this order within sixty (60) days from the date on which this order becomes final, annually thereafter for five (5) years on the anniversary date of this order, and at such other times as the Commission may by written notice to the respondent require; and B. Notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in respondent such as dissolution, assignment or sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation, or any other change in the corporation, including the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries, that may affect compliance obligations arising out of this order. CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MARY L. AZCUENAGA The available evidence shows that officers of Quality Trailer Products Corporation made an uninvited visit to the headquarters of a competitor and, in a face-to-face meeting with an officer of that competitor, made an unambiguous offer to fix the prices of certain products. No justification or excuse has been advanced for this conduct. In these limited circumstances, and based on evidence independent of any testimony or material within the control of the competitor who received the offer, I have voted to accept this consent agreement.

CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER DEBORAH K. OWEN The complaint in this matter alleges that two of respondent's representatives invited an officer of a competitor to fix prices. QUALITY TRAILER PRODUCTS CORPORATION 949 944 Concurring Statement Specifically, they told the competitor that certain of its prices were too low and that there was no5 1 3 1 2 8 1201 691 108 34 96.456718 need for the companies to compete on price, and provided assurances that respondent would not sell below a specified price. The invitation was not accepted. The conduct did not relate to any proposed, bona fide integration between the parties.

If the alleged invitation had been accepted, it clearly would have constituted a restraint of trade. However, in this case, the invitation to collude itself -- the attempt to engage in a naked price restraint -is alleged to be an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. No allegation is made in the complaint as to respondent's market power. The order in this case prohibits the respondent from: (1) suggesting or advocating that any other producer or seller fix prices or engage in any other pricing action; and (2) entering, or attempting to enter, into any agreement with another producer or seller to fix prices. Purchasing, or negotiating the purchase of, a competitor's product is expressly not prohibited.

Enforcement actions with respect to invitations to collude on price are no longer novel. See United States v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114 (Sth Cir. 1984). However, the conduct in American Airlines was challenged as an illegal attempt to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Under Section 2, proof of market power was required. Here, the complaint does not allege market power or dangerous probability of monopolization. The issue is whether Commission action is appropriate with respect to unaccepted invitations to collude on price in oligopolistic or unconcentrated markets.

Invitations to collude on price in such markets fall outside the parameters of the Sherman Act, and require invocation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Although the reach of Section 5 has been argued vigorously, legislative history and case law support its extension beyond the strict purview of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, and preventing monopolization in its incipiency enjoys special recog- Concurring Statement 115 F.T.C.

nition.’ Nonetheless, invoking the penumbra of the antitrust laws through the use of Section 5 warrants cautious analysis.” With respect to oligopolistic markets, Professors Areeda and Turner have argued that a5 1 3 2 2 6 1180 797 215 37 96.833931 solicitations 1 3 2 2 7 1410 806 35 29 96.675636 to5 1 3 2 2 8 1459 800 91 36 96.675636 raises 1 3 2 2 9 1562 801 116 46 96.968719 prices5 1 3 2 2 10 1692 803 36 36 96.621689 in5 1 3 2 2 11 1742 812 145 29 96.621689 concert5 1 3 2 2 12 1900 817 82 35 96.366333 may4 1 3 2 3 0 644 850 1337 61 -1 5 1 3 2 3 1 644 850 130 36 93.251595 reduces 1 3 2 3 2 801 851 138 44 73.231750 [firms']5 1 3 2 3 3 964 854 232 46 96.863007 uncertainty,5 1 3 2 3 4 1220 856 113 36 96.890915 either5 1 3 2 3 5 1354 857 46 46 96.613495 by5 1 3 2 3 6 1424 859 129 47 96.613495 settings 1 3 2 3 7 1576 871 19 25 96.794846 a5 1 3 2 3 8 1618 867 111 40 96.794846 targets 1 3 2 3 9 1751 863 98 46 96.630600 prices 1 3 2 3 10 1872 875 41 25 96.879234 or5 1 3 2 3 11 1934 865 47 46 96.818527 by4 1 3 2 4 0 643 908 1337 51 -1 5 1 3 2 4 1 643 908 132 46 96.950005 raising5 1 3 2 4 2 788 909 213 37 96.969597 confidence5 1 3 2 4 3 1015 911 72 36 96.214294 that5 1 3 2 4 4 1098 912 107 36 96.736832 rivals5 1 3 2 4 5 1219 914 73 35 93.265213 will5 1 3 2 4 6 1306 910 172 41 0.000000 follow.* The invitation to collude may, by its very existence, and whether or not it is accepted, facilitate pricing coordination among rivals. Areeda and Turner suggest Section 5 of the FTC Act as one avenue for attacking such solicitations,’ and the Ethyl case makes clear that under circumstances of “oppressive” behavior Section 5 covers certain unilateral conduct in an oligopolistic setting.° Another possibility, in a market with relatively few competitors, is that the invitation to collude comes from a representative of a broader group of competitors, who are now colluding, or who wish to collude in the future. If the group is sufficiently broad, acceptance of the offer will clearly injure consumers. However, having to allege and prove some broader conspiracy or other alternative to market power can be difficult. There may be no clear, observable manifestation of such conduct, and those engaged in it will usually take precautions to avoid leaving a paper trail to any agreement. ' Fora general discussion of the scope of the statute, see Averitt, The Meaning of Unfair5 1 5 1 2 3 799 2091 139 30 96.985596 Methods5 1 5 1 2 4 950 2091 35 30 96.572807 of5 1 5 1 2 5 1003 2092 212 32 95.392960 Competition in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 2] B.C.L.Rev. 227 (1980).

? As noted in the 1989 Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission (at 20 n.11), [although5 1 5 2 3 6 1244 2289 21 30 96.902321 it5 1 5 2 3 7 1278 2290 23 30 96.954056 is5 1 5 2 3 8 1315 2291 68 29 96.554176 wells 1 5 2 3 9 1396 2292 181 30 96.450890 established5 1 5 2 3 10 1589 2293 60 30 96.674355 that5 1 5 2 3 11 1663 2294 121 29 96.674355 Sections 1 5 2 3 12 1797 2295 41 29 94.462502 5's5 1 5 2 3 13 1852 2295 57 30 96.936195 bans 1 5 2 3 14 1922 2305 38 21 96.936195 on4 1 5 2 4 0 625 2333 1335 44 -1 5 1 5 2 4 1 625 2333 102 30 92.679916 ‘unfair5 1 5 2 4 2 738 2334 135 30 96.655235 methods5 1 5 2 4 3 886 2334 35 30 97.018242 of5 1 5 2 4 4 931 2335 201 39 69.384743 competition’5 1 5 2 4 5 1145 2337 120 38 96.706184 permits5 1 5 2 4 6 1279 2338 48 30 96.843643 thes 1 5 2 4 7 1339 2339 73 29 96.695145 FTC5 1 5 2 4 8 1424 2344 30 24 93.272659 to5 1 5 2 4 9 1466 2340 151 37 93.224007 proscribes 1 5 2 4 10 1630 2342 129 29 96.801140 conducts 1 5 2 4 11 1771 2348 51 24 96.694855 not5 1 5 2 4 12 1834 2343 126 30 96.528587 reached4 1 5 2 5 0 623 2382 1336 44 -1 5 1 5 2 5 1 623 2382 39 38 97.018036 by5 1 5 2 5 2 677 2382 166 39 96.968384 prevailing5 1 5 2 5 3 859 2383 234 39 96.920067 interpretations5 1 5 2 5 4 1108 2385 35 29 96.951195 of5 1 5 2 5 5 1155 2385 48 30 96.735580 thes 1 5 2 5 6 1219 2385 142 31 96.291580 Sherman5 1 5 2 5 7 1375 2388 57 29 96.291580 ands 1 5 2 5 8 1447 2388 127 38 96.748795 Clayton5 1 5 2 5 9 1589 2390 83 34 96.873367 Acts,5 1 5 2 5 10 1687 2390 81 30 96.299706 there5 1 5 2 5 11 1783 2391 25 29 96.694412 is5 1 5 2 5 12 1823 2400 16 20 96.929337 a5 1 5 2 5 13 1854 2391 105 31 96.933182 debate4 1 5 2 6 0 623 2430 1335 47 -1 5 1 5 2 6 1 623 2430 87 29 97.004456 about5 1 5 2 6 2 721 2430 67 29 96.946266 how5 1 5 2 6 3 799 2431 44 29 96.778122 far5 1 5 2 6 4 853 2431 118 30 93.215836 Sections 1 5 2 6 5 982 2432 16 29 93.215836 55 1 5 2 6 6 1011 2433 118 29 96.690598 reaches5 1 5 2 6 7 1139 2433 118 38 96.745041 beyond5 1 5 2 6 8 1268 2435 82 29 96.843735 those5 1 5 2 6 9 1361 2436 96 29 91.485512 Acts. The Report generally cautions that the Commissions 1 5 2 7 4 998 2481 107 29 96.462410 should5 1 5 2 7 5 1119 2481 53 30 96.462410 files 1 5 2 7 6 1186 2491 16 20 96.594826 a5 1 5 2 7 7 1216 2491 69 21 96.865753 cases 1 5 2 7 8 1299 2484 70 37 96.865753 only5 1 5 2 7 9 1384 2485 87 28 96.834160 when5 1 5 2 7 10 1485 2485 20 29 96.834160 it5 1 5 2 7 11 1519 2494 54 21 96.400978 cans 1 5 2 7 12 1588 2486 158 38 96.400978 anticipates 1 5 2 7 13 1760 2488 88 29 96.483925 relief5 1 5 2 7 14 1859 2488 61 30 96.109970 that5 1 5 2 7 15 1934 2489 24 29 97.000908 is4 1 5 2 8 0 621 2526 1335 46 -1 5 1 5 2 8 1 621 2526 151 39 96.862701 practical,5 1 5 2 8 2 787 2527 91 39 96.858116 likely5 1 5 2 8 3 892 2533 30 24 96.744720 to5 1 5 2 8 4 934 2529 122 38 96.048035 remedy5 1 5 2 8 5 1069 2529 48 30 96.724693 thes 1 5 2 8 6 1129 2530 158 37 96.674400 perceived5 1 5 2 8 7 1300 2531 91 35 96.829704 harm,5 1 5 2 8 8 1406 2533 56 29 96.747406 ands 1 5 2 8 9 1475 2538 51 24 96.747406 not5 1 5 2 8 10 1540 2534 111 38 97.013481 unduly5 1 5 2 8 11 1663 2535 226 34 90.407509 burdensome, Jd.

at 17, thus implying that some sort of demonstration of injury is appropriate. 3p. Areeda & D. Turner, 6 Antitrust Law 117 (1986). * Id. at 118.

° E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984). QUALITY TRAILER PRODUCTS CORPORATION 951 944 Concurring Statement Apparently unconcentrated markets present the most difficult cases to analyze. Nonetheless, various theories of harm from solicitations to collude in such markets have been posited. First, invitations to collude on price may cause injury even in an unconcentrated market. For instance, as the recently issued Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines make clear, a firm may have the ability to price discriminate as to certain customers, or within certain smaller geographic regions.®° Under those circumstances, injury from acceptance of the invitation may be foreseeable since an apparently unconcentrated market may actually be narrower than would first seem. Furthermore, parties to the invitation may have differentiated products that are the first and second choices of certain buyers in the market, or they may share relative advantages in serving some buyers.’ Similarly, in a given bidding situation, the potential for harm to an individual customer may exist.* The question then becomes: is it reasonable to assume from the solicitation to collude, in and of itself, that acceptance would injure consumers? Economists frequently tell us that firms do not usually engage in irrational acts. This could suggest that a party who solicits price collusion harbors some expectation that its acceptance will actually produce anticompetitive gains: why would anyone risk going to jail for price-fixing if he would not even benefit if the invitation were accepted? It may therefore be appropriate to begin with a rebuttable inference that acceptance of the solicitation would have harmed consumers. Requiring a showing of market power, or equivalent alternative, may shield attempts to reach such collusive © Sections 1.12 & 1.22. 5 (CCH) Trade Reg. Rep. J 13,104 (Apr. 2, 1992) ("Merger Guidelines").

7 Merger Guidelines, Section 2.21.

® The theory behind the cases brought by the Justice Department, in which market power has not been alleged, is that the solicitation is an attempted fraud on the customer because it is an5 1 7 3 3 7 1073 2569 121 33 81.084396 attempts 1 7 3 3 8 1206 2569 31 24 95.833977 to5 1 7 3 3 9 1250 2563 102 30 95.833977 inflate5 1 7 3 3 10 1366 2562 95 38 96.703056 prices5 1 7 3 3 11 1477 2561 82 36 96.893341 [that]5 1 7 3 3 12 1574 2566 165 24 96.513092 customers5 1 7 3 3 13 1753 2559 100 29 96.054413 would5 1 7 3 3 14 1867 2559 36 28 96.881508 be4 1 7 3 4 0 568 2608 1337 44 -1 5 1 7 3 4 1 568 2616 140 30 96.198586 deceived5 1 7 3 4 2 719 2615 60 29 96.995811 into5 1 7 3 4 3 790 2614 146 38 92.980255 believing5 1 7 3 4 4 949 2637 25 6 91.902115 ...5 1 7 3 4 5 987 2622 75 20 96.735695 were5 1 7 3 4 6 1073 2612 147 39 96.708168 governed5 1 7 3 4 7 1231 2611 38 38 97.013527 by5 1 7 3 4 8 1281 2611 109 29 96.829781 markets 1 7 3 4 9 1400 2609 105 34 95.882996 forces,5 1 7 3 4 10 1517 2614 49 24 96.927582 not5 1 7 3 4 11 1577 2608 47 30 96.927582 thes 1 7 3 4 12 1636 2612 91 26 96.958092 secrets 1 7 3 4 13 1738 2611 167 33 96.987732 agreement4 1 7 3 5 0 568 2655 1335 47 -1 5 1 7 3 5 1 568 2665 35 30 97.005432 of5 1 7 3 5 2 615 2664 219 38 83.006874 competitors. See, Reports 1 7 3 5 5 1084 2662 77 28 96.968452 from5 1 7 3 5 6 1176 2659 125 30 96.961098 Officials 1 7 3 5 7 1315 2657 222 38 74.915848 Washington, Remarks of James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the 39th Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting of the Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association (Apr. 12, 1991), at 9 (quoting U.S. v. Critical Industries Co.). Concurring Statement 115 F.T.C.

agreements from antitrust penalties. In a sense, the offender may be given a free bite at the apple -- if its solicitation is spurned, it is not subject to antitrust penalties, and if the invitation is accepted, an agreement may be consummated that presumptively harms consumers, but might never be detected.

While I find these arguments in favor of deterring invitations to collude on price compelling, it is not without a reservation. If it is objectively unlikely that the firms in question would succeed in exercising market power, or if some other theory of harm cannot be proffered, one might question whether the participants indeed anticipated any anticompetitive gains. This raises the concern that the solicitation that is being characterized as a solicitation to price-fix may in fact be something else, perhaps a solicitation to embark on a broader joint venture or some other efficient agreement. Some procompetitive joint ventures necessarily involve ancillary agreements that affect prices. Accordingly, we do not want to prohibit attempts to implement procompetitive joint activities simply because one of the terms the joint venturers must agree on is price, such as in the BMI situation.” Otherwise, we could deprive consumers of efficient new forms of marketing or new products. This consideration imposes on us a duty to ensure that the conduct involved is indeed an invitation to join in a naked price restraint, and not an efficient agreement. Thus, while an iron-clad demonstration of harm is not, in my view, a prerequisite to prosecuting a Section 5 case against attempted price-fixing, the absence of potential injury compels us to check our facts on the issue of whether a pure naked restraint alone is involved.’° It is from this perspective that I believe we should also view the remedies in this case. Where the Commission finds reason to believe that the law has been violated, it will frequently fence-in the challenged conduct, prohibiting conduct that would otherwise be legal. This can ensure against future violations, facilitate enforcement of its order, and remedy any ° Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See also National Bancard Corp. v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986).

10 Tn this case, I believe that at least one of the theories of harm applies and no bona fide, proposed integration was involved. QUALITY TRAILER PRODUCTS CORPORATION 953 944 Concurring Statement lingering effect of the violation. The order in this case, by imposing a blanket prohibition on urging any price action by a competitor, or attempting to enter into an agreement to fix prices, could be interpreted to prohibit, in addition to naked price-fixing invitations, a solicitation to enter into a procompetitive joint venture that incidentally involved the setting of prices. While such a prohibition might be acceptable in this case for fencing-in and enforcement purposes, I do not interpret this action to mean that the Commission intends to discourage solicitations to joint venture, or any other legitimate activity that may involve price discussions. Indeed, the Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment expressly notes that the facts in this case did not involve any bona fide integration, and the proviso expressly permits the discussion of prices with respect to certain sales between competitors." In sum, I voted in favor of this consent agreement because the facts of the case compel a conclusion that an attempt was made to engage in hard-core, price-fixing. On that basis, and because of the Commission's unique enforcement needs here, I do not interpret our action to stifle legitimate efforts to joint venture. Finally, I believe that the conduct of the respondent was not harmless. In5 1 5 1 1 2 711 2501 72 38 96.836517 lights 1 5 1 1 3 796 2501 34 29 96.739899 of5 1 5 1 1 4 839 2502 47 29 96.739899 thes 1 5 1 1 5 899 2503 201 37 95.141922 respondent's5 1 5 1 1 6 1114 2509 124 23 96.862335 consents 1 5 1 1 7 1249 2509 31 24 96.726624 to5 1 5 1 1 8 1292 2504 82 29 96.937492 these5 1 5 1 1 9 1386 2504 92 29 97.019409 broad5 1 5 1 1 10 1490 2504 207 38 96.466522 prohibitions,5 1 5 1 1 11 1711 2505 20 29 95.963470 it5 1 5 1 1 12 1744 2505 24 30 95.963470 is5 1 5 1 1 13 1781 2505 57 30 96.610771 fair5 1 5 1 1 14 1849 2511 30 24 96.610771 to4 1 5 1 2 0 558 2548 1337 41 -1 5 1 5 1 2 1 558 2556 118 21 96.717453 assumes 1 5 1 2 2 687 2548 59 29 96.882713 that5 1 5 1 2 3 757 2548 56 29 96.958229 this5 1 5 1 2 4 825 2548 155 38 96.442474 particulars 1 5 1 2 5 990 2557 146 30 96.442474 company5 1 5 1 2 6 1149 2550 71 28 96.574875 does5 1 5 1 2 7 1233 2555 50 23 96.536362 not5 1 5 1 2 8 1294 2551 155 37 96.504105 anticipates 1 5 1 2 9 1461 2560 56 28 97.001137 any5 1 5 1 2 10 1529 2551 95 29 96.694160 futures 1 5 1 2 11 1631 2551 78 38 96.694160 joints 1 5 1 2 12 1720 2557 129 28 96.534409 venture,5 1 5 1 2 13 1862 2561 33 20 96.957451 or4 1 5 1 3 0 553 2595 1341 40 -1 5 1 5 1 3 1 553 2595 78 37 96.656853 joints 1 5 1 3 2 651 2596 51 29 96.021812 bids 1 5 1 3 3 722 2596 131 38 96.021812 activity,5 1 5 1 3 4 874 2596 59 30 96.615173 that5 1 5 1 3 5 953 2597 99 29 96.782013 would5 1 5 1 3 6 1072 2597 37 29 96.390381 be5 1 5 1 3 7 1128 2597 166 38 96.662788 prohibited5 1 5 1 3 8 1314 2598 92 29 96.528717 under5 1 5 1 3 9 1424 2598 57 29 96.480255 this5 1 5 1 3 10 1501 2599 93 29 95.813515 order.5 1 5 1 3 11 1631 2599 72 30 96.683502 This5 1 5 1 3 12 1723 2600 101 29 96.735771 would5 1 5 1 3 13 1843 2605 51 24 96.613518 nota 1 5 1 4 0 557 2644 1335 42 -1 5 1 5 1 4 1 557 2644 181 38 96.846916 necessarily5 1 5 1 4 2 763 2644 37 30 96.111237 be5 1 5 1 4 3 826 2650 61 24 95.830772 true5 1 5 1 4 4 913 2645 35 29 95.830772 of5 1 5 1 4 5 970 2645 84 29 96.173668 others 1 5 1 4 6 1078 2646 183 37 96.630905 companies,5 1 5 1 4 7 1288 2647 57 28 95.810692 ands 1 5 1 4 8 1370 2656 82 20 95.810692 more5 1 5 1 4 9 1478 2647 123 30 96.827759 tailored5 1 5 1 4 10 1626 2647 89 30 94.971069 relief5 1 5 1 4 11 1737 2648 94 38 96.665115 might5 1 5 1 4 12 1855 2649 37 28 96.398018 be4 1 5 1 5 0 556 2692 1336 42 -1 5 1 5 1 5 1 556 2692 187 38 96.259819 appropriate5 1 5 1 5 2 757 2693 92 29 96.938538 under5 1 5 1 5 3 862 2692 139 30 96.565735 different5 1 5 1 5 4 1015 2693 83 30 96.862595 facts.5 1 5 1 5 5 1124 2694 213 34 96.720909 Furthermore,5 1 5 1 5 6 1351 2694 29 30 96.977577 in5 1 5 1 5 7 1394 2695 47 29 96.760307 thes 1 5 1 5 8 1455 2700 87 25 96.930801 events 1 5 1 5 9 1556 2695 59 30 97.019150 that5 1 5 1 5 10 1628 2696 48 29 96.606567 thes 1 5 1 5 11 1689 2697 203 37 96.748917 respondent's4 1 5 1 6 0 555 2740 1336 39 -1 5 1 5 1 6 1 555 2740 86 37 96.865349 plans5 1 5 1 6 2 663 2741 124 38 96.465637 change,5 1 5 1 6 3 810 2742 68 37 96.888992 they5 1 5 1 6 4 900 2742 89 28 96.794991 could5 1 5 1 6 5 1011 2742 123 37 96.799156 petitions 1 5 1 6 6 1156 2743 48 28 96.189140 thes 1 5 1 6 7 1225 2743 205 30 95.952187 Commissions 1 5 1 6 8 1451 2743 47 30 95.952187 for5 1 5 1 6 9 1519 2753 36 20 96.927582 an5 1 5 1 6 10 1577 2745 85 28 96.643486 orders 1 5 1 6 11 1683 2744 208 30 96.699051 modification4 1 5 1 7 0 555 2789 392 38 -1 5 1 5 1 7 1 555 2794 141 33 96.730988 pursuant5 1 5 1 7 2 707 2794 30 24 96.378990 to5 1 5 1 7 3 755 2789 33 29 96.694725 165 1 5 1 7 4 802 2789 75 29 96.870544 CFR5 1 5 1 7 5 890 2790 57 29 94.473839 2.5. Complaint 115 F.T.C.