Times-Mirror Company

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IN THE MATTER OF THE TIMES-MIRROR COMPANY Docket 9103. Interlocutory Order, July 25, 1978 This order grants the appeal of complaint counsel for reinstatement of count II of the complaint, dismissed by order of the administrative law judge. ORDER GRANTING COMPLAINT COUNSEL’S APPEAL FROM OrbDER Dismissing COUNT Il OF THE COMPLAINT On July 27, 1977, the Commission issued its complaint in this matter alleging violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, (15 U.S.C. 45), and Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. 13(a)) in connection with respondent’s sale of retail advertising in The Los Angeles Times. , This matter is now before the Commission on appeal by complaint counsel, pursuant to Section 3.23(b) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, from the order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing count II (the Robinson-Patman charge) of the complaint.* The ALJ ruled that newspaper advertising is not a “commodity” within the meaning of section 2(a) and, therefore, count II fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree with the ALJ’s holding and reinstate count II of the complaint.

In reaching his decision, the law judge relied on court decisions holding that the term “commodities” is limited only to tangible products, not intangibles or services.? In addition, he looked to statements made after passage of the Robinson-Patman Act by one of its co-authors to the effect that such items as advertising, insurance and brokerage service are not commodities for purposes of the Act.? The judge also cited two recent district court decisions specifically holding that newspaper advertising is not a commodity within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.* After reviewing these authorities, the ALJ concluded that, although newspapers are tangible goods, the respondent is selling “the service Thes 1 7 3 12 2 798 2267 128 51 95.265839 allegations5 1 7 3 12 3 932 2290 24 19 96.873558 of5 1 7 3 12 4 960 2292 64 17 96.962212 counts 1 7 3 12 5 1031 2290 8 19 96.728737 I5 1 7 3 12 6 1046 2289 24 20 96.809242 of5 1 7 3 12 7 1074 2289 38 20 96.351891 thes 1 7 3 12 8 1117 2289 121 25 96.377068 complaint,5 1 7 3 12 9 1246 2289 92 25 96.982132 relating5 1 7 3 12 10 1345 2292 22 17 95.994263 to5 1 7 3 12 11 1373 2289 84 21 95.994263 Sections 1 7 3 12 12 1464 2291 11 19 96.660110 55 1 7 3 12 13 1483 2290 23 20 96.242775 of5 1 7 3 12 14 1510 2291 37 20 96.334763 thes 1 7 3 12 15 1553 2291 50 20 96.838638 FTC5 1 7 3 12 16 1609 2291 46 23 94.902382 Act,5 1 7 3 12 17 1663 2298 37 13 96.538918 ares 1 7 3 12 18 1707 2294 36 17 96.894386 not5 1 7 3 12 19 1750 2293 23 18 96.679413 at5 1 7 3 12 20 1780 2292 56 20 96.183945 issues 1 7 3 12 21 1843 2292 57 20 96.183945 here.3 1 7 4 0 0 688 2323 1315 93 -1 4 1 7 4 1 0 729 2323 1273 27 -1 5 1 7 4 1 1 729 2325 8 10 89.179878 25 1 7 4 1 2 750 2323 47 25 67.539215 E.g.,5 1 7 4 1 3 810 2323 100 20 92.568657 Freeman5 1 7 4 1 4 919 2329 19 13 92.366875 v.5 1 7 4 1 5 950 2323 91 24 96.864113 Chicago5 1 7 4 1 6 1053 2323 53 20 93.275948 Titles 1 7 4 1 7 1117 2324 16 19 93.275948 &5 1 7 4 1 8 1146 2323 60 20 93.243416 Trusts 1 7 4 1 9 1217 2323 38 21 92.306671 Co.,5 1 7 4 1 10 1269 2323 38 20 96.879707 5055 1 7 4 1 11 1318 2323 49 20 96.210083 F.2d5 1 7 4 1 12 1378 2323 36 20 96.420586 5275 1 7 4 1 13 1425 2323 45 24 80.748466 (7th5 1 7 4 1 14 1480 2324 41 20 96.688988 Cir.5 1 7 4 1 15 1534 2324 58 24 95.433258 1974)5 1 7 4 1 16 1602 2325 56 23 95.433258 (titles 1 7 4 1 17 1669 2325 112 20 96.263077 insurance5 1 7 4 1 18 1791 2327 37 18 96.629608 not5 1 7 4 1 19 1837 2332 15 13 96.013412 a5 1 7 4 1 20 1862 2326 140 24 96.013412 commodity);4 1 7 4 2 0 689 2356 1314 27 -1 5 1 7 4 2 1 689 2357 67 20 91.878052 Baum5 1 7 4 2 2 763 2363 19 13 91.878052 v.5 1 7 4 2 3 790 2357 103 20 96.933212 Investors5 1 7 4 2 4 900 2356 126 25 96.651535 Diversified5 1 7 4 2 5 1033 2356 94 21 93.275970 Services,5 1 7 4 2 6 1136 2356 48 21 38.214130 Inc:,5 1 7 4 2 7 1192 2356 38 20 96.858864 4095 1 7 4 2 8 1238 2356 49 20 95.458031 F.2d5 1 7 4 2 9 1294 2356 39 20 95.475388 8725 1 7 4 2 10 1340 2356 45 24 95.999527 (7th5 1 7 4 2 11 1393 2356 41 20 96.857254 Cir.5 1 7 4 2 12 1444 2357 58 24 96.894730 1969)5 1 7 4 2 13 1509 2357 91 24 96.751030 (mutual5 1 7 4 2 14 1608 2358 52 19 96.651917 funds 1 7 4 2 15 1668 2358 73 20 96.451630 shares5 1 7 4 2 16 1748 2360 38 18 96.663155 not5 1 7 4 2 17 1792 2359 159 24 91.492699 commodities);5 1 7 4 2 18 1961 2359 42 20 91.492699 Tri-4 1 7 4 3 0 688 2389 1314 27 -1 5 1 7 4 3 1 688 2390 59 20 96.836372 States 1 7 4 3 2 754 2390 152 24 96.985847 Broadcasting5 1 7 4 3 3 913 2390 31 20 92.941292 Co.5 1 7 4 3 4 954 2396 19 13 92.941292 v.5 1 7 4 3 5 985 2389 77 20 96.341690 United5 1 7 4 3 6 1067 2389 60 20 97.002388 Press5 1 7 4 3 7 1134 2389 158 22 93.294533 International,5 1 7 4 3 8 1302 2390 47 21 93.150703 Inc.,5 1 7 4 3 9 1359 2389 38 20 96.878410 3695 1 7 4 3 10 1405 2390 48 20 95.489120 F.2d5 1 7 4 3 11 1462 2390 37 20 96.801483 2685 1 7 4 3 12 1507 2391 45 23 96.707878 (5th5 1 7 4 3 13 1559 2391 41 19 96.637146 Cir.5 1 7 4 3 14 1611 2391 59 24 96.423073 1966)5 1 7 4 3 15 1677 2391 53 24 96.861206 (sales 1 7 4 3 16 1736 2391 24 20 96.986397 of5 1 7 4 3 17 1765 2398 58 14 96.331421 news5 1 7 4 3 18 1830 2394 83 22 96.948135 reports5 1 7 4 3 19 1920 2393 82 20 96.439659 treated2 1 8 0 0 0 688 2423 1315 161 -1 3 1 8 1 0 0 688 2423 1315 58 -1 4 1 8 1 1 0 688 2423 1315 27 -1 5 1 8 1 1 1 688 2430 24 13 95.233086 as5 1 8 1 1 2 720 2424 44 19 96.678589 sales 1 8 1 1 3 772 2423 22 20 96.906441 of5 1 8 1 1 4 800 2430 14 13 96.948700 a5 1 8 1 1 5 822 2423 113 25 96.921524 privilege);5 1 8 1 1 6 945 2423 50 20 93.088982 CBS5 1 8 1 1 7 1001 2430 18 12 91.787880 v.5 1 8 1 1 8 1028 2424 85 18 94.276756 Amana5 1 8 1 1 9 1121 2423 156 24 93.289032 Refrigeration,5 1 8 1 1 10 1288 2423 47 21 93.112144 Inc.,5 1 8 1 1 11 1346 2423 38 20 96.981667 2955 1 8 1 1 12 1391 2423 49 20 95.641777 F.2d5 1 8 1 1 13 1448 2423 39 25 96.512115 3755 1 8 1 1 14 1495 2424 44 23 95.719078 (7th5 1 8 1 1 15 1548 2424 40 19 96.872780 Cir.5 1 8 1 1 16 1600 2424 58 24 95.901123 1961)5 1 8 1 1 17 1666 2425 52 23 96.681961 (sales 1 8 1 1 18 1726 2425 23 19 97.009651 of5 1 8 1 1 19 1755 2425 111 20 96.357269 broadcasts 1 8 1 1 20 1873 2425 130 25 96.453171 advertising4 1 8 1 2 0 688 2457 260 24 -1 5 1 8 1 2 1 688 2458 51 18 96.016335 times 1 8 1 2 2 746 2459 37 17 95.752892 not5 1 8 1 2 3 789 2464 14 12 95.752892 a5 1 8 1 2 4 810 2457 138 24 95.742653 commodity).3 1 8 2 0 0 729 2490 817 24 -1 4 1 8 2 1 0 729 2490 817 24 -1 5 1 8 2 1 1 729 2493 7 9 72.558594 35 1 8 2 1 2 750 2491 29 18 72.558594 W.5 1 8 2 1 3 787 2491 97 21 92.588867 Patman,5 1 8 2 1 4 891 2490 107 24 96.612434 Completes 1 8 2 1 5 1005 2490 68 19 96.558586 Guides 1 8 2 1 6 1081 2491 21 18 96.806023 to5 1 8 2 1 7 1109 2490 36 19 93.283363 thes 1 8 2 1 8 1153 2490 206 19 92.000214 Robinson-Patman5 1 8 2 1 9 1365 2490 41 19 96.334251 Acts 1 8 2 1 10 1411 2490 69 24 96.705734 (1963)5 1 8 2 1 11 1486 2492 24 17 96.848099 at5 1 8 2 1 12 1516 2491 30 18 96.848099 33.3 1 8 3 0 0 688 2523 1312 61 -1 4 1 8 3 1 0 729 2523 1271 25 -1 5 1 8 3 1 1 729 2526 7 10 35.690147 «5 1 8 3 1 2 750 2524 103 19 96.602440 National5 1 8 3 1 3 862 2524 46 19 95.972549 Tires 1 8 3 1 4 919 2523 115 21 94.879288 Wholesale,5 1 8 3 1 5 1045 2523 40 19 93.197151 Inc.5 1 8 3 1 6 1096 2530 18 12 92.214478 v.5 1 8 3 1 7 1128 2523 133 24 96.684700 Washington5 1 8 3 1 8 1269 2523 53 21 96.657043 Post,5 1 8 3 1 9 1333 2523 37 19 92.927589 4415 1 8 3 1 10 1380 2523 20 19 91.658096 F.5 1 8 3 1 11 1410 2523 62 25 96.316811 Supp.5 1 8 3 1 12 1483 2524 23 18 93.135704 815 1 8 3 1 13 1516 2524 80 23 92.758888 (D.D.C.5 1 8 3 1 14 1607 2524 64 24 96.185532 1977),5 1 8 3 1 15 1681 2525 75 23 92.624969 appeals 1 8 3 1 16 1763 2525 103 21 92.624969 docketed,5 1 8 3 1 17 1878 2525 38 20 96.758186 No.5 1 8 3 1 18 1924 2525 76 20 96.580864 7811484 1 8 3 2 0 688 2556 1312 28 -1 5 1 8 3 2 1 688 2557 54 24 28.141640 (D.C.5 1 8 3 2 2 750 2557 40 20 95.170059 Cir.5 1 8 3 2 3 799 2557 47 19 96.815331 Feb.5 1 8 3 2 4 856 2557 30 22 96.891075 22,5 1 8 3 2 5 895 2557 62 23 94.949005 1978);5 1 8 3 2 6 964 2557 104 18 96.650887 National5 1 8 3 2 7 1073 2557 57 18 96.940994 Auto5 1 8 3 2 8 1136 2556 88 19 96.665840 Brokers5 1 8 3 2 9 1231 2556 56 25 92.576874 Corp.5 1 8 3 2 10 1297 2563 17 12 92.576874 v.5 1 8 3 2 11 1324 2557 89 19 96.518379 General5 1 8 3 2 12 1418 2557 80 19 93.277687 Motors5 1 8 3 2 13 1505 2557 63 27 92.944244 Corp.,5 1 8 3 2 14 1577 2557 76 19 89.852654 1974-25 1 8 3 2 15 1660 2557 67 20 97.002785 Trades 1 8 3 2 16 1733 2557 64 21 96.933838 Cases5 1 8 3 2 17 1804 2558 82 24 53.691578 75,2815 1 8 3 2 18 1894 2558 106 24 86.852173 (S.D.N.Y.2 1 9 0 0 0 689 2586 980 34 -1 3 1 9 1 0 0 689 2586 980 34 -1 4 1 9 1 1 0 689 2586 980 34 -1 5 1 9 1 1 1 689 2586 63 34 96.264954 1974).5 1 9 1 1 2 1667 2597 2 2 0.000000 , TIMES-MIRRUOR CU. 251 230 Interlocutory Order of taking the advertiser’s message into a million homes, with its own circulation list and its own means of distribution.” Thus, while both a service and a product are involved, “the dominant. nature of respondent’s business can best be characterized as the sale of a service and not the sale of commodities. . . .” The specific question before us has never been formally addressed by the Commission* and the Supreme Court has expressly reserved ruling on the issue.* .

Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits under certain circumstances discrimination in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. It is clear that the Robinson-Patman Act applies only if a challenged price discrimination involves the sale of commodities. Price discrimination in noncommodity transactions, such as the furnishing of services, is not actionable under the statute.” _ Although it is clear that the Act applies only to sales of commodities, the scope of that term is more ambiguous. Neither the original Clayton Act nor the Robinson-Patman amendments provide a definition of the term “commodities.” The statutes do contain other references to “goods, wares, or merchandise”® and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, relating to exclusive dealing contracts, includes the language “goods, wares, merchandise, machinery supplies or other commodities . . . .”* While helpful, such language does not unambiguously clarify the reach of the term “commodities.” Moreover, the legislative histories of these statutes do not provide specific guidance as to what the term “commodities” encompasses.” 5 Shortly after passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, the C ission closed a ion 2(a) matter concerning the sale of advertising space because it did not involve the sale of a commodity. 81 Cong. Rec. App. 2336-37 (1987). However, that same year the Commission issued an uncontested order under section 2(a) prohibiting price discrimination in the sale of a Christmas club savings plan which included the sale of passbooks, account books and advertising literature. Christmas Club, 25 F.T.C. 1116 (1987). ¢ In oral argument in Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), government counsel referred to the C ission action di d in note 5 supra. In a footnote, the Court referred to this as an “early informa] Federal Trade Commission opinion,” and specifically stated that it expressed no- views on the Commission’s statutory interpretation. 345 U.S. at 609, n. 27. 7 Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Act prohibit the furnishing of services or facilities on a discriminatory basis, but these sections are addressed to merchandising or promotional aids which are furnished by a supplier to customers in connection with a sale of products or commodities. * The words, “goods, wares, or merchandise,” which app in Secti 2(a) and 2(c), were also contained in Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act.

* The term “commodities” in Section 3 has since been interpreted by one court as having essentially the same meaning as the words “goods, wares, or merchandise.” Baum v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., supra note 2, at 875.

1° Congress specifically excluded labor from the coverage of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 17, but other exclusions are not delineated in the statute. Further, at least some members of Congress apparently believed that insurance would be covered by the Act except for a Supreme Court ruling that insurance contracts and policies were not in interstate commerce. See 51 Cong. Rec. 9390 (1914). Interlocutory Order 92 F.T.C.

However, similar language is contained in many state statutes which Congress looked to in passing the Clayton Act," and court decisions construing these or related state antitrust laws have not adopted a restrictive definition of commodities.? Although the state precedent offers no unequivocal guide to Congress’ intentions, it does suggest that Congress was more concerned about the overall thrust of the statute and that primary emphasis should be placed on defining the term “commodities” within that context, rather than attempting to draw unduly fine distinctions between tangible and intangible roducts.

Since the word “commodities” was carried over from the Clayton Act, it is not surprising that the legislative history of the Robinson- Patman amendments sheds little additional light on the meaning of commodities. What is clear is that Congress’ concern with chain store buying practices focused attention on pricing activities involving products which are unquestionably tangible in nature. That is reflected, understandably, in statements made during consideration of the legislation leading to passage of the Robinson- Patman Act.** In addition, the language of the statute reflects emphasis on those types of transactions concerning clearly tangible goods, such as the reference in section 2(a) to price changes allowed for perishable or obsolescent goods. Representative Patman has since stated that the word “commodity” in its broadest sense could include items of trade other than those in tangible form, but that in the Robinson-Patman Act the term is used in an ordinary commerical sense to designate any movable or tangible thing.* Thus, in his opinion, advertising, insurance, brokerage service, and similar items would be excluded from the Act’s coverage though they might be commodities in the broader sense.

In construing the Robinson-Patman Act, the courts have adopted the tangible/intangible dichotomy and consistently taken the position that the Act applies only to transactions which have tangible characteristics.* Although virtually no transfer of an A5 1 4 1 1 2 785 2122 36 20 95.834358 lists 1 4 1 1 3 828 2122 24 20 96.950729 of5 1 4 1 1 4 856 2122 37 20 96.886757 thes 1 4 1 1 5 903 2122 23 20 96.886757 195 1 4 1 1 6 933 2124 68 18 96.756660 states5 1 4 1 1 7 1008 2123 68 19 97.002548 which5 1 4 1 1 8 1085 2123 42 19 96.940819 had5 1 4 1 1 9 1134 2123 88 20 93.293060 enacted5 1 4 1 1 10 1229 2124 111 23 92.969810 anti-prices 1 4 1 1 11 1347 2124 167 20 96.601021 discriminations 1 4 1 1 12 1522 2124 51 20 96.607147 laws5 1 4 1 1 13 1580 2125 57 24 96.908173 prior5 1 4 1 1 14 1645 2127 22 18 96.903473 to5 1 4 1 1 15 1675 2132 85 18 93.467377 passages 1 4 1 1 16 1768 2127 23 19 97.004623 of5 1 4 1 1 17 1796 2127 37 19 97.000061 thes 1 4 1 1 18 1840 2127 90 24 96.972771 Clayton5 1 4 1 1 19 1937 2128 41 19 96.962402 Acts 1 4 1 1 20 1985 2128 18 19 96.913193 is4 1 4 1 2 0 687 2155 641 26 -1 5 1 4 1 2 1 687 2157 32 19 96.984764 sets 1 4 1 2 2 726 2156 57 20 96.765091 forth5 1 4 1 2 3 790 2156 22 19 96.993111 in5 1 4 1 2 4 820 2155 50 20 95.601997 H.R.5 1 4 1 2 5 878 2156 49 23 96.723526 Rep.5 1 4 1 2 6 935 2156 39 20 96.723526 No.5 1 4 1 2 7 982 2156 44 23 96.761497 627,5 1 4 1 2 8 1034 2156 24 19 92.560791 635 1 4 1 2 9 1066 2156 69 24 84.464287 Cong.,5 1 4 1 2 10 1143 2156 25 20 97.002480 2d5 1 4 1 2 11 1176 2155 52 21 85.333359 Sess.5 1 4 1 2 12 1237 2156 12 20 95.355713 95 1 4 1 2 13 1255 2157 73 24 95.355713 (1914).3 1 4 2 0 0 685 2189 1316 290 -1 4 1 4 2 1 0 729 2189 1272 28 -1 5 1 4 2 1 1 729 2191 14 10 34.639008 1 For example, in two state cases, one decided before and the other after enactment of the Clayton Act, courts found that telephone service, McKinley Telephone Co. v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 140 N.W. 38, 40 (Wis. 1913), and electricity, State v. Interstate Power Co., 226 N.W. 427, 433 (Neb. 1929), were commodities for purposes of the applicable H , a8 respondent points out, in the only reported case addressing the commodity issue under section 2(a) of the original Clayton Act, Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (1934), the court there distinquished the McKinley decision on the grounds that the Wisconsin statute went beyond the federal law by proscribing restraints on the supply as well as the price of “any article or commodity.” Jd. at 764. The court, though, ultimately luded that discriminatory bus transportation rates were not covered by Section 2a), a decision which is not inconsistent with the result we reach here. 13 See Representative Patman’s remarks in connection with introduction of his bill at 79 Cong. Rec. 9079 (1935). W. Patman, supra note 3.

8 See cases supra note 2.

TIMES-MIRROR CO. 233 230 Interlocutory Order intangible such as a service, right or privilege can be accomplished without the involvement of tangibles,'* the courts have held that the incidental existence of a tangible item will not suffice to bring a transaction within the Act’s coverage. Rather it is the dominant or essential nature of the transaction which the courts have looked to in determining if it falls within the scope of the Act.” Certainly there is no doubt about the Robinson-Patman Act’s application to tangible products that are clearly identifiable as such. Nor is there any doubt that the Act was not intended to reach transactions of a purely service nature, as reflected in the Fleetway decision, supra note 12. The difficult issue arises where, as here, the transaction cannot be neatly categorized as either a service or tangible product. In our view the proper course is to construe the term “commodities” in light of the fundamental purposes and structure of the statute, rather than becoming preoccupied with metaphysical considerations about what is or is not a tangible product.

From that perspective, we conclude that it is consistent with the language and spirit of the Robinson-Patman Act to treat newspaper advertising as a commodity for purposes of Section 2(a). Clearly unjustified discrimination in the pricing of newspaper advertising space can adversely impact on competition at the retail level just as surely as price discriminations associated with the purchase and resale of products by retailers in the ordinary course of their business. More specifically, the transactions at stake here are amenable to the detailed provisions of the Act. In other words, the product sold (ie, newspaper advertising space) is sufficiently fungible in nature to be susceptible to the kind of non-discriminatory pricing contemplated by the legislative scheme. Respondent contends, however, that the wording of the Robinson- Patman Act precludes its application to the instant transactions, citing provisions permitting price differentials based upon “differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery” and changes affecting the “marketability of the goods concerned,” such as “deterioration of perishable goods,” and “obsolescense of seasonal goods.” To be sure, it is not likely that the latter exceptions would apply to newspaper advertising, as they probably would not be 1 E.g., Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., supra note 2, 505 F.2d at 531; Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press International, supra note 2, 369 F.2d at 270. 17 See, e.g. Tri-State Broadcasting Co., supra note 2 (right to broadcast news information, although news reports in written form); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942)(construction contract at stake rather then sale of bricks used in construction). See also CBS v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., supra note 2, 295 F.2d at 378, where the court concluded in a case brought under Section 2(a) and 3 of the Clayton Act that the sale of television advertising time involved essentially the sale of a privilege to sponsor a program and advertise.

277-685 O—79-——16 Interlocutory Order . 92 FTC.

invoked for many other tangible products. Yet, it seems equally clear that newspaper advertising space can be sold for “use, consumption, or resale,” measured in terms of “like grade and quality” and priced in a manner that reflects differences in the cost of “manufacture, sale, or delivery.” 15 U.S.C. 13(a)(emphasis added). To put the issue differently, there is nothing inherent in the sale of newspaper advertising space that requires particularized skills or treatment for different customers which would render the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to such transactions especially difficult. Unlike the negotiation of a construction contract, the sale of investment or other professional services, or the provision of transportation, the product being sold here functionally conforms to the statutory framework.

To treat newspaper advertising as a commodity does no violence to the structure of the Act, nor does it open the floodgates for litigation concerning a host of transactions which bear little relationship to the purposes underpinning the statute. To the contrary, we believe our interpretation effectuates the purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act while recognizing the limiting features built into that legislation.12 We conclude, therefore, that newspaper advertising, despite the attendant service aspects, is essentially a commodity within the meaning of Section 2(a).

It is ordered, That complaint counsel’s appeal from the order dismissing count II of the complaint be, and it hereby is, granted. 18 To the extent that our decision is in any way inconsistent with previous court decisions construing the meaning of the term “commodities,” we respectfully decline to follow those holdings. Similarly, although we respect the contrary views expressed earlier by the co-author of the Robinson-Patman Act, we believe greater weight in this instance should be given to the history and purposes of the Act than should be accorded to Representative Patman’s statements made after its passage. See United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 874 US. 321, 348-49 (1968).

DRIVER TRAINING INSTITUTE, INC., ET AL. 235 235 Complaint