Candy Kern-Fuller, Howard Sutter III, and Upstate Law Group LLC

Agency: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Date: Feb. 20, 2020
Type: enforcement action
Source: consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/candy-kern-fuller-howard-sutte
Pages: 35
PDFs: 2 documents (links below)

Documents in this case

Complaint · Feb. 2020 · 19 p.
Stipulation · Feb. 2021 · 15 p.

Case summary

On February 20, 2020, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Bureau), the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs (South Carolina), and Arkansas Attorney General Leslie Rutledge (Arkansas) filed a lawsuit in federal district court in the District of South Carolina against Candy Kern-Fuller, Howard Sutter III, and Upstate Law Group LLC. The complaint alleged that the defendants worked with a series of companies that brokered contracts offering high-interest credit to consumers, primarily disabled veterans, and violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s prohibition against deceptive acts or practices and against providing substantial assistance to deceptive and unfair acts or practices of others.

The action builds on a number of recent Bureau actions against other entities that used similar contracts and similar marketing tactics in offering high-interest credit to veterans. In January 2019, the Bureau settled with Mark Corbett. In August 2019, in partnership with Arkansas, the Bureau settled with Andrew Gamber; Voyager Financial Group, LLC; BAIC, Inc.; and SoBell Corp. In October 2019, in partnership with South Carolina, the Bureau filed a lawsuit against Katharine Snyder and her companies; Performance Arbitrage Company, Inc., and Life Funding Options, Inc. Corbett worked with both Gamber and Snyder, and their respective companies, to broker contracts offering high-interest credit. In each of these actions, the Bureau alleged that these contracts violate laws that prohibit these transactions and render them void, contrary to the representations made by Corbett, Gamber, Snyder, and their companies that the transactions were valid and enforceable. In these actions, the Bureau also alleged that the companies misrepresented to consumers that the product is a sale of payments and not a high-interest credit offer and failed to inform consumers of the products’ interest rates.

In this more recent action, the Bureau, South Carolina, and Arkansas alleged that the defendants assisted Gamber, Snyder, and their companies. The complaint specifically alleged that the defendants provided substantial assistance to the companies’ deceptive and unfair acts or practices by: developing a pre-approval or risk-assessment process for the contracts and conducting underwriting; approving or denying consumers’ applications to enter into the transactions; directing and administering the execution of the contracts; serving as the payment processor for the initial lump-sum payment and fees; and continuing to serve as the transactions’ payment processor. In addition, the complaint alleged that the defendants provided substantial assistance to deceptive misrepresentations by Gamber’s and Snyder’s companies to consumers that consumers may be subject to criminal prosecution if they breached their contacts when, in fact, the consumers could not be criminally prosecuted for breaching their contracts. The complaint also alleged that the defendants committed deceptive acts or practices by collecting on the contracts brokered by the companies, including by filing suit when consumers failed to make payments, and representing, expressly or impliedly, that consumers are legally obligated to make payments in accordance with the terms of their contracts when, in fact, the contracts are void from inception and consumers are not obligated to make payments.

On January 21, 2021, the court entered a stipulated final judgment and order imposing a judgment for equitable monetary relief against the defendants in the amount of $725,000 for consumer redress. It also permanently bans the defendants, among other things, from brokering sales or assignments of pensions and disability benefits and from collecting on any of these contracts.

Complaint (Feb. 2020)

PDF of this document (19 pages)

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Page 1 of 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA (GREENVILLE DIVISION)

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection;

South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs; and the State of Arkansas ex rel.

Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General,

Plaintiffs, v.

Candy Kern-Fuller, Howard Sutter III, and Upstate Law Group LLC,

Defendants.

Case No. ____________________

COMPLAINT

The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau), the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs (Department), and the State of Arkansas ex rel. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General (Arkansas), bring this action against Candy Kern-Fuller, Howard Sutter III, and Upstate Law Group LLC (Defendants) under the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a), 5564, 5565, and the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code (SCCPC), and allege as follows.

Jurisdiction and Venue 1.

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action because it is brought under “Federal consumer financial law,” 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(1), presents a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is brought by an agency of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1345. 2.

This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the Department’s state-law claims because they are so related to the federal claims that they form part of the same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 1 of 19

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Page 2 of 19 3.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants are located, reside, or do business in this district. 12 U.S.C. § 5564(f). 4.

Venue is proper because Defendants are located, reside, or do business in this district. 12 U.S.C. § 5564(f); 28 U.S.C. 1391(b).

Parties 5.

The Bureau is an independent agency of the United States created by the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). The Bureau has independent litigating authority and is authorized to initiate civil actions in federal district court to secure appropriate relief for violations of “Federal consumer financial law,” 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a)-(b), including the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(14). 6.

The Department is charged with administering and enforcing the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code, S.C. Code Ann. § 37-1-101 et seq. (SCCPC), which governs consumer-credit transactions made in South Carolina. The Department can seek an injunction against any person violating the SCCPC and request other appropriate relief, including reforming contracts to conform to the SCCPC, even though a consumer is not a party to the action. S.C. Code Ann. § 37-6-110. The Department can also bring an action against a person to recover a civil penalty for repeatedly and intentionally violating the SCCPC. The Department also is authorized to initiate civil actions in federal district court to enforce provisions of the CFPA with respect to an entity that is authorized to do business under South Carolina law. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1).

Leslie Rutledge is the Attorney General for the State of Arkansas and is the chief legal officer of the State of Arkansas. Arkansas is authorized to initiate civil actions in federal district court to enforce provisions of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1). 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 2 of 19

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Page 3 of 19 8.

Defendant Upstate Law Group LLC (ULG) is a South Carolina corporation headquartered in Easley, South Carolina and was authorized to conduct business in South Carolina by the Secretary of State’s Office. ULG provided substantial assistance to covered persons engaged in brokering contracts containing a South Carolina choice-of-law provision. ULG provided substantial assistance to covered persons engaged in brokering extensions of credit to consumers. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(A)(3). ULG also engaged in collecting debt related to extensions of credit to consumers, acted as a custodian of funds for use by or on behalf of consumers, and provided payment-processing services to consumers by technological means. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(iv), (15)(A)(vii), (15)(A)(x). ULG is therefore a “covered person” under the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(5)-(6).

Defendant Candy Kern-Fuller engaged in offering or providing consumerfinancial products or services, including by acting as a custodian of consumer funds, providing payment-processing services to a consumer by technological means, and collecting debt related to a consumer-financial product or service, and is therefore a “covered person” under the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(5)-(6), (15)(A)(iv), (15)(A)(vii), (15)(A)(x). Kern-Fuller is also a managing partner and owner of ULG. She has managerial responsibility for ULG and materially participates in the conduct of ULG’s affairs. Kern-Fuller is therefore a “related person” under the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(25)(C)(i), (ii), and is thus deemed a “covered person” under the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(25)(B). Kern-Fuller also provided substantial assistance to covered persons engaged in brokering extensions of credit to consumers. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(A)(3). 10.

Defendant Howard Sutter III engaged in offering or providing consumer-financial products or services, including by acting as a custodian of consumer funds, providing paymentprocessing services to a consumer by technological means, and collecting debt related to a 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 3 of 19

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Page 4 of 19 consumer-financial product or service, and is therefore a “covered person” under the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(5)-(6), (15)(A)(iv), (15)(A)(vii), (15)(A)(x). Sutter was also a managing partner and owner of ULG until at least November 2019. He had managerial responsibility for ULG and materially participated in the conduct of ULG’s affairs. Sutter is therefore a “related person” under the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(25)(C)(i), (ii), and is thus deemed a “covered person” under the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(25)(B). Sutter also provided substantial assistance to covered persons engaged in brokering extensions of credit to consumers. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(A)(3).

Factual Background 11.

In 2012, Defendants began working with a series of companies that brokered contracts offering high-interest credit to consumers, primarily disabled veterans. 12.

These companies were Andrew Gamber’s Arkansas-based companies, Voyager Financial Group, LLC, BAIC, Inc., and SoBell Corp., Katharine Snyder’s Mississippi-based company, Performance Arbitrage Company, Inc., and Katherine Snyder’s South Carolina-based company, Life Funding Options, Inc. (collectively, the Broker Companies).

The Transactions 13.

The Broker Companies marketed their credit offers as purchases of consumers’ future pension or disability payments.

14.

The Broker Companies set up contracts between consumers and investors where consumers received a lump-sum payment, ranging from a few thousand to tens of thousands of dollars, and were thereafter obligated to repay a much larger amount by purportedly assigning to investors part of the consumers’ monthly pension or disability payments for five to ten years. 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 4 of 19

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Page 5 of 19 15.

The majority of the high-interest credit offers brokered by the Broker Companies were for veterans who have Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability benefits or pensions administered by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). The VA establishes a veteran’s level of disability and administers disability-benefit payments. DFAS is a federal agency within the Department of Defense; it includes an office that issues monthly pension payments to military retirees.

16.

Federal law prohibits agreements under which another person acquires the right to receive a veteran’s pension or disability payments. 38 U.S.C. § 5301. Thus, the Broker Companies’ contracts are prohibited under federal law.

17.

South Carolina law, the governing law specified in the contracts’ choice-of-law provision, prohibits an assignment of earnings for payment or as security for payment of a debt arising out of a consumer loan and deems a sale of unpaid earnings made in consideration of the payment of money to the seller of the earnings to be a loan secured by an assignment of earnings. S.C. Code Ann. § 37-3-403 (2012). “Earnings” includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension, retirement, or disability program. S.C. Code Ann. § 37-1-301(15) (2012). Thus, the Broker Companies’ contracts are prohibited under South Carolina law. 18.

The Broker Companies, with Defendants’ assistance, represented to consumers that the products they brokered were sales of payments and not high-interest credit offers. For example, the first page of the “New Seller Information Packet,” sent to consumers by the Broker Companies, stated, “It is important to note that this is not a loan[.]” The first paragraph of a form email sent with the packet stated, “Please keep in mind that this is not a loan, you are selling a product for a set price.”

6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 5 of 19

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Page 6 of 19 19.

But the substance of the transactions indicates that the Broker Companies’ product was an offer of credit. Consumers had their creditworthiness assessed before they could enter a contract. Consumers’ payments were due on a regular, monthly schedule, and consumers did not give up control over their future-income streams. And the contracts permitted repayment from sources other than the contracted-for income stream. In fact, some consumers were required to purchase life-insurance policies, and Defendants even used some investors’ lump sums to purchase an additional “suicide wrapper,” so that should the consumer die and the income stream stop, the outstanding amount on the contract would still be paid.

Defendants’ Role in Underwriting the Transactions 20.

Defendants assessed consumers’ creditworthiness for the Broker Companies before consumers were allowed to enter a contract.

21.

Defendants developed a risk-assessment process to evaluate the business risk that consumers would default on their payments. A ULG employee pulled a background check on each potential consumer and sent that information to Kern-Fuller or Sutter. Kern-Fuller or Sutter also requested specific documents or information from the Broker Companies or directly from consumers, including consumers’ credit reports, asset and debt information, and monthly budgets.

22.

If Defendants determined that a consumer had too much outstanding debt, Defendants would instruct that the consumer had to pay off a certain portion of that debt before Defendants would approve the transaction.

23.

The Broker Companies would not complete a transaction without Defendants’ approval.

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Page 7 of 19 Defendants’ Role in Payment Processing Using ULG’s IOLTA Account

24.

Defendants used ULG’s Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) to receive payments from consumers, send payments to investors, and distribute commissions under the Broker Companies’ contracts.

25.

When a contract closed, the investor sent the purchase-price payment to ULG’s account. Defendants would then distribute the money, including the Broker Companies’ fees, the consumer’s lump sum, and ULG’s own fees for Defendants’ closing and payment-processing services.

26.

Kern-Fuller developed the process for how payments were distributed and was responsible for ordering any distribution of funds from ULG’s account. Sutter also was involved in the payment-distribution process and had the authority to submit transfer approvals to the bank.

27.

Consumers’ ongoing, monthly payments were directed to ULG’s account. Defendants tracked consumers’ payments and controlled the distribution of those payments to the investors.

28.

From 2012 to at least 2016, veterans were required to instruct the VA, through the VA’s online portal, to send their monthly pension or disability payments directly to ULG’s account. If the amount of a veteran’s monthly pension or disability payment was greater than the monthly payment the veteran allegedly owed under the contact, Defendants would remit the overpayment to the veteran’s bank account.

29.

By 2018, Defendants instructed veterans, as well as non-veteran consumers, to make their monthly payments to ULG’s account via ACH transfer from the consumer’s own bank account.

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Page 8 of 19 Defendants’ Role in Debt Collection 30.

If a consumer stopped making payments to ULG’s account, Defendants would contact the consumer to try to get the consumer to resume payment. Kern-Fuller and Sutter were personally involved in contacting consumers to try to get them to resume payments. 31.

Many consumers realized the illegal nature of the transactions, and some told Defendants directly that they had stopped making payments because the transactions were illegal. In response, Defendants repeatedly told consumers that the transactions were legal and that they were obligated to continue making payments. 32.

Before signing the contracts, consumers were made to sign a document stating that if they “breach this agreement [they] will subject [themselves] to civil and/or criminal prosecution.”

33.

Defendants sent demand letters to consumers, signed by Kern-Fuller, telling consumers that they were “in breach of [their] obligations under the Contract of Sale” and that they needed to arrange a payment “to stay in compliance with [their] contract[.]” 34.

If a consumer repeatedly failed to make payments, Defendants would file suit against the consumer in South Carolina state court to collect on the contract.

Additional Factual Background Supporting South Carolina State-Law Claims

In support of the state-law claims asserted in Count VI, the Department further alleges as follows:

35.

Although the Broker Companies characterized the contracts as “sales of payments,” the transactions were loans under South Carolina law. 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 8 of 19

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Page 9 of 19 36.

The Broker Companies brokered consumer loans with loan finance charges in excess of 12% a year.

Count I Substantial Assistance for Deceptive Acts or Practices, in Violation of the CFPA, Asserted by the Bureau, the Department, and Arkansas

37.

The allegations in paragraphs 1 to 34 are incorporated here by reference. 38.

The Broker Companies are covered persons under the CFPA because they engaged in brokering extensions of credit to consumers. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(5)-(7), (15)(A)(i). 39.

An act or practice is deceptive if it involves a material misrepresentation or omission that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. 40.

Information that is material to consumers is information that is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of, or conduct regarding, a product or service. 41.

The contracts brokered by the Broker Companies were void from inception because federal law prohibits agreements under which another person acquires the right to receive a veteran’s pension or disability payments, 38 U.S.C. § 5301, and because South Carolina law, which governs the contracts, prohibits sales of unpaid earnings and prohibits assignments of pensions as security on payment of a debt, S.C. Code Ann. § 37-3-403. 42.

The Broker Companies repeatedly misrepresented to consumers that the contracts they brokered are valid and enforceable. In fact, the contracts are void and illegal because assignments of veterans’ pensions are prohibited by federal law, and sales of unpaid earnings and assignments of pensions as security on payment of a debt are prohibited under South Carolina law.

6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 9 of 19

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Page 10 of 19 43.

The Broker Companies’ misrepresentations of the contracts as valid and enforceable and their failure to disclose the illegality of the contracts were likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

44.

The Broker Companies’ misrepresentations and omissions were material because they were likely to influence the decisions of consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, including by leading consumers to believe that it was legal to sell or assign their pensions.

45.

Therefore, the Broker Companies engaged in deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B). 46.

It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or recklessly provide substantial assistance to a covered person in violation of § 1031 of the CFPA, and the provider of such substantial assistance is deemed in violation of that section to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(A)(3). 47.

Defendants provided substantial assistance to the Broker Companies’ deceptive acts or practices by: developing a pre-approval or risk-assessment process for the contracts and conducting underwriting; approving or denying consumers’ applications to enter into the transactions; directing and administering the execution of the contracts; serving as the payment processor for the initial lump-sum payment and fees; and continuing to serve as the transactions’ payment processor, tracking and controlling the collection and distribution of consumers’ payments on the contracts.

48.

Defendants knowingly or recklessly provided this substantial assistance. Defendants knew or should have known that the contracts were illegal and void from inception. Defendants were aware not only that consumers questioned the legality of the transactions, but 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 10 of 19

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Page 11 of 19 also of multiple publicly available cease-and-desist orders issued against the Broker Companies by state regulators, which stated that veterans’ pensions are unassignable under federal law. Defendants were also aware of several private lawsuits challenging the legality of the product offered by the Broker Companies.

49.

Therefore, Defendants are deemed to have engaged in deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA to the same extent as the Broker Companies. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(A)(3).

Count II Substantial Assistance for Deceptive Acts or Practices, in Violation of the CFPA, Asserted by the Bureau, the Department, and Arkansas

50.

The allegations in paragraphs 1 to 34 are incorporated here by reference. 51.

The Broker Companies are covered persons under the CFPA because they engaged in brokering extensions of credit to consumers. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(5)-(7), (15)(A)(i). 52.

An act or practice is deceptive if it involves a material misrepresentation or omission that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. 53.

Information that is material to consumers is information that is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of, or conduct regarding, a product or service. 54.

The Broker Companies’ contracts provided for consumers to receive a lump-sum payment and thereafter repay a much larger total amount over time using their monthly pension or disability payments.

55.

The Broker Companies represented to consumers that their products were sales and not high-interest credit offers. In fact, these products were high-interest credit offers because they purported to allow consumers to incur a debt and defer the right to repay. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(7).

6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 11 of 19

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Page 12 of 19 56.

The Broker Companies’ misrepresentations and omissions regarding the nature of the products they brokered were likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

57.

The Broker Companies’ misrepresentations and omissions were material to consumers because they were likely to influence the decisions of consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, including by rendering consumers unable to compare the cost of the Broker Companies’ products with other potential sources of credit. 58.

Therefore, the Broker Companies engaged in deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B). 59.

60.

Defendants knowingly or recklessly provided this substantial assistance. Defendants knew or should have known that the contracts were not sales but high-interest credit offers. Defendants were aware of multiple publicly available cease-and-desist orders issued against the Broker Companies by state regulators and of various private lawsuits attacking the business model of the Broker Companies and other companies with similar business models. 61.

Therefore, Defendants are deemed to have engaged in deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA to the same extent as the Broker Companies. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(A)(3). 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 12 of 19

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Page 13 of 19 Count III Substantial Assistance for Unfair Acts or Practices, in Violation to the CFPA, Asserted by the Bureau, the Department, and Arkansas

62.

The allegations in paragraphs 1 to 34 are incorporated here by reference. 63.

An act or practice is unfair if it causes or is likely to cause consumers substantial injury that is not reasonably avoidable and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.

64.

The Broker Companies failed to inform consumers of their products’ interest rates.

65.

The Broker Companies’ practice caused or likely caused substantial injury to consumers because it prevented consumers from comparing alternative products. And by failing to inform consumers about the products’ interest rates, the Broker Companies deprived consumers of information consumers would need to determine whether the product was usurious and therefore potentially unlawful under their state’s law. 66.

Consumers could not reasonably have avoided injury in this situation; consumers could not reasonably be expected to make the interest-rate calculation themselves, particularly after the Broker Companies misrepresented that the product was not a high-interest credit offer. 67.

This injury was not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.

68.

Therefore, the Broker Companies engaged in unfair acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c), 5536(a)(1)(B). 69.

Defendants provided substantial assistance to the Broker Companies’ unfair acts or practices by: developing a pre-approval or risk-assessment process for the contracts and conducting underwriting; approving or denying consumers’ applications to enter into the 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 13 of 19

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Page 14 of 19 transactions; directing and administering the execution of the contracts; serving as the payment processor for the initial lump-sum payment and fees; and continuing to serve as the transactions’ payment processor, tracking and controlling the collection and distribution of consumers’ payments on the contracts.

70.

Defendants knowingly or recklessly provided this substantial assistance. Defendants knew or should have known that the Broker Companies’ products carried an interest rate and that the Broker Companies did not disclose any interest rate to consumers. Defendants were aware of multiple publicly available cease-and-desist orders issued against the Broker Companies and of various private lawsuits attacking the business model of the Broker Companies and other companies with similar business models. 71.

Therefore, Defendants are deemed to have engaged in unfair acts or practices in violation of the CFPA to the same extent as the Broker Companies. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(A)(3).

Count IV Substantial Assistance for Deceptive Acts or Practices, in Violation of the CFPA, Asserted by the Bureau, the Department, and Arkansas

72.

The allegations in paragraphs 1 to 34 are incorporated here by reference. 73.

The Broker Companies are covered persons under the CFPA because they engaged in brokering extensions of credit to consumers. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(5)-(7), (15)(A)(i). 74.

An act or practice is deceptive if it involves a material misrepresentation or omission that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. 75.

Information that is material to consumers is information that is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of, or conduct regarding, a product or service. 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 14 of 19

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Page 15 of 19 76.

The Broker Companies represented to consumers that consumers may be subject to criminal prosecution if they breached their contacts. In fact, the consumers could not be criminally prosecuted for breaching their contracts. 77.

The Broker Companies’ misrepresentation that consumers could be criminally prosecuted for failing to pay was likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

78.

The Broker Companies’ misrepresentation was material to consumers because it was likely to influence the decisions of consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, including by causing consumers to pay money they were not legally obligated to pay. 79.

Therefore, the Broker Companies engaged in deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B). 80.

Defendants provided substantial assistance to the Broker Companies’ deceptive acts or practices by: developing a pre-approval or risk assessment process for the contracts and conducting underwriting; approving or denying consumers’ applications to enter into the transactions; directing and administering the execution of the contracts; serving as the payment processor for the initial lump-sum payment and fees; and continuing to serve as the transactions’ payment processor, tracking and controlling the collection and distribution of consumers’ payments on the contracts.

81.

Defendants knowingly or recklessly provided this substantial assistance. Defendants knew or should have known that consumers could not be criminally prosecuted for breaching their contracts.

82.

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Page 16 of 19 Count V Deceptive Acts or Practices, in Violation of the CFPA, Asserted by the Bureau, the Department, and Arkansas

83.

The allegations in paragraphs 1 to 34 are incorporated here by reference. 84.

Defendants collect on the contracts brokered by the Broker Companies, including by initiating ACH debts to take payments from consumers’ bank accounts, demanding payments from consumers in letters and other communications, and filing suit when consumers failed to make payments.

85.

Defendants have represented, expressly or impliedly, that consumers are legally obligated to make payments in accordance with the terms of their contracts. In fact, the contracts were void from inception and consumers are not obligated to make payments. 86.

Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions regarding consumers’ legal obligations to make payments were likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

87.

Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions were material because they were likely to influence the decisions of consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, including by leading consumers to make payments that they were not legally obligated to make. 88.

Therefore, Defendants engaged in deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B).

Count VI Unconscionable Debt Collection, in Violation of the SCCPC, Asserted by the Department

89.

The allegations in paragraph 1 to 36 are incorporated here by reference. 90.

Defendants engaged in unconscionable conduct in attempting to collect a debt as defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5-108.

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Page 17 of 19 91.

Defendants made fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of consumer debt. S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5-108(5)(c). 92.

Defendants filed actions for breach of contract and specific performance when they knew or should have known the contracts for sales of unpaid earnings and assignments of pensions as security on payment of a debt are prohibited under South Carolina law. Defendants repeatedly misrepresented the contracts as valid and enforceable. 93.

Therefore, Defendants engaged in unconscionable debt collection in violation of the SCCPC.

Demand for Relief Wherefore, the Bureau, the Department, and Arkansas request that the Court: 1.

permanently enjoin Defendants from committing future violations of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a), or any provision of “Federal consumer financial law,” as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 5481(14);

permanently enjoin Defendants from brokering, offering, or arranging purported sales or assignments of pensions or disability benefits; 3.

permanently enjoin Defendants from attempting to enforce any contract purporting to sell or assign a consumer’s pension or disability benefits; 4.

permanently enjoin Defendants from all collection activity against any consumer for any contract purporting to sell or assign the consumer’s pension or disability benefits; 5.

permanently enjoin Defendants from committing future violations of the SCCPC; 6.

permanently enjoin Defendants from assisting others engaging in any conduct proscribed by the Court;

declare the contracts void ab initio and unenforceable; 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 17 of 19

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Page 18 of 19 8.

grant additional injunctive relief as the Court may deem just and proper; 9.

award restitution, damages, or other monetary relief against Defendants; 10.

order Defendants to pay redress to harmed consumers; 11.

order Defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains; 12.

impose on Defendants civil money penalties; 13.

order Defendants to pay the Bureau’s, the Department’s, and Arkansas’s costs incurred in connection with prosecuting this action; and 14.

award additional relief as the Court may determine to be just and proper.

(signature block on following page) 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 02/20/20 Entry Number 1 Page 18 of 19

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Respectfully submitted,

Thomas G. Ward

Enforcement Director Jeffrey Paul Ehrlich Deputy Enforcement Director Kara K. Miller Assistant Litigation Deputy s/ David Hendricks

David Hendricks (Fed. ID # 10547) Benjamin Konop (OH Bar # 0073458) Telephone: (202) 435-7265 E-mail: [email protected] Lane Powell (MI Bar # P79432) Telephone: (415) 844-9784 E-mail: [email protected] Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 1700 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20552 Facsimile: (202) 435-7329 Attorneys for Plaintiff Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection

s/ Kelly H. Rainsford

Kelly H. Rainsford (Fed. ID #10209) Telephone: (803) 734-4236 E-mail: [email protected] James C. Copeland (Fed. ID #12318) Telephone: (803) 734-0375 E-mail: [email protected] South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs 293 Greystone Boulevard, Suite 400 P.O. Box 5757 Columbia, SC 29250-5757 Attorneys for Plaintiff South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs

Leslie Rutledge Attorney General s/ Kelly H. Rainsford

Kate Donoven (AR Bar # 98189) Senior Assistant Attorney General (pro hac vice application to be filed) Arkansas Attorney General’s Office 323 Center Street, Suite 200 Little Rock, AR 72201 Telephone: (501) 682-8114 Facsimile: (501) 682-8118 [email protected] Attorney for Plaintiff State of Arkansas ex rel. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General

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Stipulation (Feb. 2021)

PDF of this document (15 pages)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs, and the State of Arkansas ex rel.

Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General,

Plaintiffs,

Candy Kern, Howard Sutter III, and Upstate Law Group LLC,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 6:20-cv-00786-DCC

STIPULATED FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau), the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs (Department), and the State of Arkansas ex rel. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General (Arkansas) (Plaintiffs) commenced this civil action on February 20, 2020, to obtain injunctive and monetary relief and civil penalties from Candy Kern, Howard Sutter III, and Upstate Law Group LLC (Defendants). The Complaint alleges violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a), 5564, 5565, in connection with Defendants’ provision of substantial assistance to the brokering of contracts offering high-interest credit to consumers, including (1) misrepresenting to consumers that the contracts are valid and enforceable when, in fact, the contracts are void from inception because federal law prohibits agreements under which another person acquires the right to receive a veteran’s pension payments, 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(3)(C), and because South Carolina law, which governs the contracts, prohibits sales of unpaid earnings and prohibits assignments of pensions as security on payment of a debt, S.C. Code Ann. § 37-3-403; (2) misrepresenting to consumers that 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 01/21/21 Entry Number 52 Page 1 of 15

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the offered product is a sale of payments and not a high-interest credit offer; (3) failing to inform consumers of the applicable interest rate on the credit offer, (4) representing to consumers that consumers may be subject to criminal prosecution if they breached their contracts, and (5) representing, expressly or impliedly, that consumers are legally obligated to make payments in accordance with the terms of their contracts when, in fact, the contracts were void from inception and consumers are not obligated to make payments. The Complaint also alleges violations of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code, S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5-108 (SCCPC), for unconscionable debt collection.

Plaintiffs and Defendants consent to entry of this Stipulated Final Judgment and Order (Order), without adjudication of any issue of fact or law, to settle and resolve all matters in dispute between these parties arising from the conduct alleged in the Complaint. FINDINGS 1.

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action because it is brought under “[f]ederal consumer financial law,” 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(1), presents a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is brought by an agency of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1345. 2.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they are located, reside, or do business in this district. 12 U.S.C. § 5564(f). 4.

Venue is proper because Defendants are located, reside, or do business in this district. 12 U.S.C. § 5564(f).

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Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations in the Complaint, except as specified in this Order. For purposes of this Order, Defendants admit the facts necessary to establish the Court’s jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of this action. 6.

Defendants waive all rights to seek judicial review or otherwise challenge or contest the validity of this Order and any claim they may have under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, concerning the prosecution of this action to the date of this Order. Each Party agrees to bear its own costs and expenses, including, without limitation, attorneys’ fees. 7.

Defendants have documented to Plaintiffs’ satisfaction their inability to pay more than the redress ordered below.

Entry of this Order is in the public interest. DEFINITIONS 9.

The following definitions apply to this Order: a.

“Affected Consumer” means a consumer who entered into a contract related to their pension or disability income stream: i. that was brokered, offered, arranged, purchased, or collected on by Andrew Gamber or any of his companies, Voyager Financial Group, LLC, BAIC, Inc., or SoBell Corp., or Katharine Snyder or any of her companies, Performance Arbitrage Company, Inc. or Life Funding Options, Inc., while working with Defendants, or ii. where Defendants reviewed the consumer’s application to enter into the transaction; directed or administered the execution of the contract; served as the payment processor for the initial lump-sum payment or 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 01/21/21 Entry Number 52 Page 3 of 15

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fees; served as the payment processor for consumer’s payments on the contract; or collected or attempted to collect on the contract. b.

“Assisting Others” means helping, aiding, or providing support to others, including but not limited to:

consulting in any form whatsoever;

ii.

providing paralegal or administrative support services; iii.

formulating or providing, or arranging for the formulation or provision of, any advertising or marketing material, including, but not limited to, any telephone-sales script, direct-mail solicitation, or the text of any Internet website, email, or other electronic communication or advertisement;

iv.

providing names of, or assisting in the generation of, potential customers;

performing marketing, billing, or payment services of any kind; vi.

participating in or providing services related to the offering, sale, or servicing of a product or the collection of payments for a product; vii.

acting or serving as an owner, officer, director, manager, principal, partner, or limited partner of any entity; and viii.

investing or loaning money.

c. “Defendants” means the Individual Defendants and the Corporate Defendant, individually, collectively, or in any combination. i. “Corporate Defendant” means Upstate Law Group LLC, its employees, and its successors and assigns. 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 01/21/21 Entry Number 52 Page 4 of 15

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ii. “Individual Defendants” means Candy Kern, Howard Sutter III, collectively, or in any combination, and each of them by any other name by which they might be known.

“Effective Date” means the date on which the Order is entered on the docket. e.

“Enforcement Director” means the Assistant Director of the Office of Enforcement for the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection or his or her delegate.

“Related Consumer Action” means a private action by or on behalf of one or more consumers or an enforcement action by another governmental agency brought against Defendants based on substantially the same facts as described in the Complaint.

“Relevant Period” means the period from January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2020.

ORDER CONDUCT RELIEF I. Permanent Ban IT IS ORDERED that:

10.

Defendants, whether acting directly or indirectly, are permanently restrained from engaging in, and Assisting Others in engaging in: a. brokering, offering, or arranging purported sales or assignments of pensions and disability benefits, including extensions of credit related to pension or disability benefits;

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b. any collection activity related to any contract purporting to sell or assign a consumer’s pension or disability benefits or any alleged debt arising from the purported sale or assignment of a consumer’s pension or disability benefits; and c. any financial-services business in the State of South Carolina (including the business of securities, commodities, banking, insurance, or real estate), unless acting in the regular course of the practice of law. Nothing in this Order shall be read as an exception to this Paragraph. II. Prohibition on Use of Customer Information IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

11.

Defendants, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys and all other Persons in active concert or participation with any of them, who receive actual notice of this Order, whether acting directly or indirectly, may not: a. disclose, use, or benefit from customer information, including names, addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, social security numbers, other identifying information, or any data that enables access to a customer’s account (including a credit card, bank account, or other financial account), that Defendant obtained before the Effective Date; or b. attempt to collect, sell, assign, or otherwise transfer any right to collect payment from any consumer who entered into a contract related to their pension or disability income stream.

However, customer information may be disclosed if requested by a government agency or required by law, regulation, or court order.

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MONETARY PROVISIONS III. Order to Pay Redress IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

12.

A judgment for equitable monetary relief is entered in favor of the Bureau and against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $725,000. 13.

Within 30 days of the Effective Date, Defendants must pay to the Bureau, by wire transfer to the Bureau or to the Bureau’s agent, and according to the Bureau’s wiring instructions, $725,000, in full satisfaction of the judgment as ordered in Paragraph 12 of this Section.

14.

With regard to any redress ordered under this Section, if Defendants receive, directly or indirectly, any reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made under any insurance policy, or if Defendants secure a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state, or local tax, Defendants must: (a) immediately notify the Enforcement Director in writing, and (b) within 10 days of receiving the funds or monetary benefit, Defendants must transfer to the Bureau the full amount of such funds or monetary benefit (Outside Payment) to the Bureau or to the Bureau’s agent according to the Bureau’s wiring instructions. After the Bureau receives the Outside Payment, the amount of the judgment referenced in Paragraph 12 will be reduced by the amount of the Outside Payment. 15.

Any funds received by the Bureau in satisfaction of this judgment will be deposited into a fund or funds administered by the Bureau or to the Bureau’s agent according to applicable statutes and regulations to be used for redress for injured consumers, including but not limited to refund of moneys, restitution, damages, or other monetary relief, and for any attendant expenses for the administration of any such redress.

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16.

If the Bureau determines, in its sole discretion, that redress to consumers is wholly or partially impracticable or if funds remain after redress is completed, the Bureau will deposit any remaining funds in the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement. Defendants will have no right to challenge any actions that the Bureau or its representatives may take under this Section. 17.

Payment of redress to any Affected Consumer under this Consent Order may not be conditioned on that Affected Consumer waiving any right. IV. Additional Monetary Provisions

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

18.

In the event of any default on Defendants’ obligations to make payment under this Order, interest, computed under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, as amended, will accrue on any outstanding amounts not paid from the date of default to the date of payment and will immediately become due and payable.

19.

Defendants relinquish all dominion, control, and title to the funds paid under this Order to the fullest extent permitted by law, and no part of the funds may be returned to Defendants.

20.

The facts alleged in the Complaint will be taken as true and be given collateral estoppel effect, without further proof, in any subsequent civil litigation by or on behalf of the Bureau to enforce this Order or the Bureau’s rights to any payment or monetary judgment under this Order, such as a non-dischargability complaint in any bankruptcy case. 21.

Within 30 days of the entry of a final judgment, order, or settlement in a Related Consumer Action, Defendants must notify Plaintiffs in writing of the final judgment, order, or settlement. That notification must indicate the amount of redress, if any, that Defendants paid or 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 01/21/21 Entry Number 52 Page 8 of 15

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are required to pay to consumers and describe the consumers or classes of consumers to whom that redress has been or will be paid.

22.

Upon written request of a representative of the Bureau, any consumer reporting agency must furnish consumer reports to the Bureau concerning any Individual Defendant under Section 604(a)(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 168l b(a)(1), which may be used for purposes of collecting and reporting on any delinquent amount arising out of this Order. COMPLIANCE PROVISIONS

V. Reporting Requirements IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

23.

Defendants must notify Plaintiffs of any development that may affect compliance obligations arising under this Order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor company; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any act or practice subject to this Order; the filing of any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding by or against any Defendant; or a change in any Defendant’s name or address. Defendants must provide this notice at least 30 days before the development or as soon as practicable after learning about the development, whichever is sooner.

24.

Within 7 days of the Effective Date, each Defendant must: a.

designate at least one telephone number and email, physical, and postal address as points of contact, which Plaintiffs may use to communicate with each Defendant;

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identify all businesses for which any Defendant is the majority owner, or that any Defendant directly or indirectly controls, by all of their names, telephone numbers, and physical, postal, email, and Internet addresses; i. describe the activities of each such business, including the products and services offered, and the means of advertising, marketing, and sales;

identify each Individual Defendants’ telephone numbers and all email, Internet, physical, and postal addresses, including all residences; and d.

describe in detail each Individual Defendants’ involvement in any business for which they perform services in any capacity or which they wholly or partially own, including each Individual Defendants’ title, role, responsibilities, participation, authority, control, and ownership. 25.

Each Defendant must report any change in the information required to be submitted under Paragraph 24 at least 30 days before the change or as soon as practicable after learning about the change, whichever is sooner. 26.

Within 90 days of the Effective Date, and again one year after the Effective Date, Defendants must submit to Plaintiffs an accurate written compliance progress report sworn to under penalty of perjury (Compliance Report), which, at a minimum: a.

lists each applicable paragraph and subparagraph of the Order and describes in detail the manner and form in which Defendants have complied with each such paragraph and subparagraph of this Order; and b.

attaches a copy of each Order Acknowledgment obtained under Section VI, unless previously submitted to Plaintiffs.

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VI. Order Distribution and Acknowledgment IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

27.

Within 7 days of the Effective Date, each Defendant must submit to the Enforcement Director, the Department, and Arkansas an acknowledgment of receipt of this Order, sworn under penalty of perjury.

28.

Within 30 days of the Effective Date, each Defendant (including each Individual Defendant, for any business of which he or she is the majority owner or which he or she directly or indirectly controls) must deliver a copy of this Order to each of its owners, board members, and officers, as well as to any managers, employees, service providers, or other agents and representatives who have responsibilities related to the subject matter of the Order. 29.

For 5 years from the Effective Date, each Defendant (including each Individual Defendant, for any business of which he or she is the majority owner or which he or she directly or indirectly controls) must deliver a copy of this Order to any business entity resulting from any change in structure referred to in Section V, any future owners, board members, and officers, as well as any employees, service providers, or other agents and representatives who will have responsibilities related to the subject matter of the Order before they assume their responsibilities.

30.

Defendants must secure a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of a copy of this Order, ensuring that any electronic signatures comply with the requirements of the E-Sign Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq., within 30 days of delivery, from all persons receiving a copy of this Order under this Section.

31.

Within 90 days of the Effective Date, each Defendant must provide the Bureau with a list of all persons and their titles to whom this Order was delivered through that date under 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 01/21/21 Entry Number 52 Page 11 of 15

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Paragraphs 28 and 29 and a copy of all signed and dated statements acknowledging of receipt of this Order under Paragraph 31.

VII. Recordkeeping IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

32.

Defendants (including each Individual Defendant, for any business of which he or she is the majority owner or which he or she directly or indirectly controls) must create all documents and business records necessary to demonstrate full compliance with each provision of the Order, including all submissions to Plaintiffs. Defendants must retain these documents for at least 5 years after creation and make them available to Plaintiffs upon request. 33.

Defendants (including each Individual Defendant, for any business of which he or she is the majority owner or which he or she directly or indirectly controls) must retain for 5 years from the Effective Date, the following business records: a.

all documents and records necessary to demonstrate full compliance with each provision of this Order, including all submissions to Plaintiffs; b.

copies of all sales scripts; training materials; advertisements; websites; and other marketing materials relating to the subject of this Order, including any such materials used by a third party on behalf of Defendants; c. for each individual Affected Consumer: the consumer’s name; address; phone number; email address; amount of the lump sum the consumer received; amount of any fees or additional costs the consumer incurred; the amount of any payments the consumer made; a copy of any promotional or welcome materials provided; and a copy of any contracts the consumer signed;

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for all contracts related to Affected Consumers, accounting records showing the gross and net revenues generated; and e.

all complaints and refund requests (whether received directly or indirectly, such as through a third party) by Affected Consumers, and any responses to those complaints or requests.

34.

Defendants must make the documents identified in Paragraph 33 available to Plaintiffs upon request.

VIII. Notices IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

35.

Unless otherwise directed in writing by Plaintiffs, Defendants must provide all submissions, requests, communications, or other documents relating to this Order in writing, with the subject line, “Bureau, et al. v. Candy Kern, et al., Case No. 6:20-cv-00786-DCC,” and send them by overnight courier or first-class mail to the below addresses and contemporaneously by email to [email protected]:

Assistant Director for Enforcement Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection ATTENTION: Office of Enforcement 1700 G Street, N.W.

Washington D.C. 20552

South Carolina Consumer Department of Consumer Affairs ATTENTION: General Counsel 293 Greystone Blvd., Ste. 400 Columbia, S.C. 29210

State of Arkansas ex rel. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General ATTENTION: Consumer Protection Attorney 323 Center St., Ste. 200 Little Rock, AR 72120

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IX. Cooperation with Plaintiffs IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

36.

Defendants must cooperate fully to help Plaintiffs determine the identity and location of, and the amount of injury sustained by, each Affected Consumer. Defendants must provide such information in their or their agents’ possession or control within 14 days of receiving a written request from any Plaintiff.

37.

Defendants must cooperate fully with Plaintiffs in this matter and in any investigation or lawsuit related to or associated with the conduct described in the Complaint. Without the service of compulsory process, Defendants must provide truthful and complete information, evidence, and testimony. Individual Defendants must appear and must cause Defendants’ officers, employees, representatives, or agents to appear for interviews, discovery, hearings, trials, and any other proceedings that any Plaintiff may reasonably request upon 14 days written notice, or other reasonable notice, at such places and times as any Plaintiff may designate, without the service of compulsory process. X. Compliance Monitoring IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

38.

Within 14 days of receipt of a written request from any Plaintiff, Defendants must submit additional Compliance Reports or other requested information, which must be sworn under penalty of perjury; provide sworn testimony; or produce documents. 39.

For purposes of this section, Plaintiffs may communicate directly with Defendants, unless Defendants retain counsel related to these communications. 40.

Defendants must permit Plaintiffs’ representatives to interview any employee or other person affiliated with Defendants who has agreed to such an interview regarding: (a) this 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 01/21/21 Entry Number 52 Page 14 of 15

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matter; (b) anything related to or associated with the conduct described the Complaint; or (c) compliance with this Order. The person interviewed may have counsel present. 41.

Nothing in this Order will limit the Bureau’s lawful use of compulsory process, under 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6, or the Department’s lawful use of its subpoena power, under S.C. Code Ann. § 37-6-106, or Arkansas’s lawful use of its subpoena power, under Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-111, 25-16-705.

XI. Retention of Jurisdiction IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

42.

All pending motions are hereby denied as moot.

43.

The Court will retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of enforcing this Order.

XII. Service IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

44.

This Order may be served upon Defendants by electronic mail, certified mail, or United Parcel Service, either by the United States Marshal, the Clerk of the Court, or any representative or agent of Plaintiffs.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

s/Donald C. Coggins, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DATED: January 21, 2021 Spartanburg, South Carolina 6:20-cv-00786-DCC Date Filed 01/21/21 Entry Number 52 Page 15 of 15